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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Crystal Lee Gabel appeals from the judgment entered upon the jury 
verdict finding her guilty of possession of a controlled substance. Gabel claims, 
for the first time on appeal, that the prosecutor committed misconduct during 
closing argument. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
During a traffic stop on a van in which Gabel was a passenger along with 
three others, Officer Santino Yago discovered a baggie of methamphetamine in 
the back seat where Gabel had been sitting. (Trial Tr. 1, p.21, L.19 - p.23, L.25, 
p.26, Ls.5-8.) Gabel ultimately admitted that she smoked methamphetamine 
four hours earlier, but the methamphetamine in the car was from an unknown 
female who gave it to her earlier in the evening because the girl did not want her 
boyfriend to have it. (Trial Tr., p.35, Ls.2-13, p.35, Ls.7-23; Exhibit 6.) 
The state charged Gabel with possession of a controlled substance -
methamphetamine. (R., pp.12-13, 24-25.) Gabel pied not guilty and the case 
proceeded to trial at which a mistrial was declared because the jury was unable 
to reach a verdict. (See R., pp.40, 74-85, 89.) A jury convicted Gabel at her 
second trial. (R., pp.108, 110.) The court imposed a unified three-year sentence 
with one and one-half years fixed, but suspended the sentence and ~ced 
Gabel on probation. (R., pp.120-122.) Gabel timely appealed. (R., pp.123-125.) 
1 There are several transcripts included in the record on appeal. References to 
"Trial Tr." are to the transcript of the trial that occurred on December 10, 2013. 
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ISSUE 
Gabel states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the State engage in one or more instances of misconduct, such 
that Ms. Gabel is entitled to a new trial? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.5.) 
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 
Has Gabel failed to establish fundamental error entitling her to relief on 
her unpreserved misconduct claims? 
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ARGUMENT 
Gabel Has Failed To Show The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct During 
Closing Argument, Much Less That The Prosecutor's Argument Amounted To 
Fundamental Error 
A. Introduction 
Gabel claims, for the first time on appeal, that the prosecutor committed 
misconduct during closing argument. (Appellant's Brief, pp.5-16.) More 
specifically, Gabel contends the prosecutor "(1) misrepresented the law during 
closing arguments; and (2) offered her own opinion on Ms. Gabel's purported 
untruthfulness and her guilt/innocence." (Appellant's Brief, p.5.) Both of Gabel's 
claims fail. A review of the record shows the prosecutor's closing argument was 
not improper, much less fundamental error. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"[T]he standard of review governing claims of prosecutorial misconduct 
depends on whether the defendant objected to the misconduct at trial." State v. 
Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 715, 215 P.3d 414, 435 (2009). If a defendant fails to 
timely object at trial to allegedly improper closing arguments by the prosecutor, 
the conviction will be set aside for prosecutorial misconduct only upon a showing 
by the defendant that the alleged misconduct rises to the level of fundamental 
error. ~ at 228, 245 P.3d at 980. 
C. Gabel Has Failed To Show Any Error In The Prosecutor's Closing 
Argument, Much Less Fundamental Error 
For the first time on appeal, Gabel raises two claims of error based on the 
prosecutor's closing argument. Under the Idaho Supreme Court's opinion in 
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State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 245 P.3d 961 (2010), unobjected to claims of 
constitutional error are reviewed using a three-part test: 
(1) the defendant must demonstrate that one or more of the 
defendant's unwaived constitutional rights were violated; (2) the 
error must be clear or obvious, without the need for any additional 
information not contained in the appellate record, including 
information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical 
decision; and (3) the defendant must demonstrate that the error 
affected the defendant's substantial rights, meaning (in most 
instances) that it must have affected the outcome of the trial 
proceedings. 
150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978 (footnote omitted). Application of this test to 
the facts of this case shows Gabel has failed to carry her burden of 
demonstrating any error in the prosecutor's closing argument, let alone 
fundamental error. 
First, Gabel contends the prosecutor misstated the law during closing 
argument when she stated: "Ladies and gentlemen, I would submit to you there 
are only two things at question in this trial. ... whether the Defendant possessed 
that meth, and whether she knew or should have known that what was in that 
baggie was methamphetamine." (12/11/2013 Tr., p.24, Ls.5-14.) Gabel argues 
this statement violated her constitutional right to due process and a fair trial 
because it was a misstatement of the law regarding the elements of possession 
of a controlled substance since the mens rea _element for the charge is not "knew 
or should have known" but is knew or believed it was methamphetamine. 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.7-10.) While Gabel correctly notes that, in order to find her 
guilty, the jury was required to find that she knew the substance in the baggie 
was methamphetamine or believed it was a controlled substance, she is 
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incorrect that the prosecutor's isolated comment that the jury needed to decide 
"whether she knew or should have known that what was in that baggie was 
methamphetamine" actually resulted in a constitutional violation. 
As noted, the first prong of the fundamental error test requires Gabel to 
demonstrate a constitutional violation. Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978. 
In support of her claim that the prosecutor's "or should have known" statement 
amounted to a constitutional violation, Gabel contends "the jurors could 
reasonably have concluded that they were directed to find [her] guilty of 
possession of a controlled substance without finding that she knew what was in 
the bag." (Appellant's Brief, p.10.) This argument ignores the fact that the jury 
was advised that it was the court's duty to instruct it on the law, that the jury was 
to "follow all the rules" as explained by the court, and that "[i]f anyone states a 
rule of law different from any rule" provided by the court, it is the court's 
instruction the jury "must follow." (Instruction No. 9 (augmentation).) Gabel does 
not dispute that the actual elements instruction was a correct statement of the 
law; her only argument is effectively that the jury ignored that instruction and 
"could" have concluded that she was guilty based on a lower standard than 
required by the court's instruction. The law presumes the contrary - "Idaho 
appellate courts ... presume that a jury follows the instructions it is given." State 
v. Joy, 155 Idaho 1, 7, 304 P.3d 276, 282 (2013) (citation omitted). 
Further, despite the prosecutor's initial "knew or should have known" 
comment, the substance of the prosecutor's argument on this element does not 
support Gabel's claim that the prosecutor could have led the jury to a verdict 
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based upon a "should have known" standard. A review of the prosecutor's 
substantive argument on the mens rea requirement shows that the prosecutor 
did not urge the jury to convict on a lesser standard. Instead, the prosecutor 
argued that the evidence supported a finding that Gabel actually knew the 
substance in the baggie was methamphetamine. She stated: 
So that leads to the question did she know it was meth. Did 
she know what was in that baggie? Well, again, just look at the 
facts. Based on her boyfriend's testimony, they were in that car 
with a known drug dealer. They knew he dealt drugs. Based on 
her statements to the officer, we know that she experimented with 
it. And then later: I used it about four hours ago. This is a 
Defendant who has used meth before. Did she know what was in 
that baggie? Yeah, she knew what was in that baggie. 
(12/11/2013 Tr., pp.10-21.) 
Because Gabel has failed to demonstrate any constitutional violation 
based on the prosecutor's comments regarding the elements of the charged 
offense, she has failed to satisfy the first prong under Perry. Gabel has also 
failed to meet her burden in relation to the second and third prongs of Perry. 
The second prong requires a showing of plain error without the need for 
any additional information, including whether the failure to object was a tactical 
decision. According to Gabel, "there could be no strategic advantage to defense 
counsel allowing the prosecutor to lower the State's burden of proof by 
misleading the jury as to whether [she] was required to know what was in the 
bag." (Appellant's Brief, p.10.) This is not so. A trial attorney, knowing that the 
court will instruct the jury on the elements and instruct the jury that it must follow 
the court's instructions, could certainly decide to capitalize on a prosecutor's 
misstatement of those elements and highlight to the jury that the prosecutor does 
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not even understand the applicable law. That the record does not reflect the 
defense attorney's decision-making in this regard does not mean such a decision 
would not be a reasonable one. Moreover, defense could have made the tactical 
decision not to object in order to potentially exploit the mistake in his own closing 
and ultimately decided not to comment on it in light of the prosecutor's actual 
argument, which was based on the correct legal standard. Accordingly, Gabel 
has not met her burden on prong two. 
Gabel's argument on the third prong also fails. Gabel acknowledges that 
the "jury did receive an instruction properly setting forth the general elements of 
possession of a controlled substance," but claims the prosecutor's single 
comment regarding "known or should have known" "left the jury with the 
impression that it could convict ... even if it found that [Gabel] did not know what 
was in the bag." (Appellant's Brief p.10.) For the reasons already stated in 
relation to the first prong, this argument lacks merit. Also lacking in merit is 
Gabel's assertion that the "hung jury" in her first trial "at which the prosecutor did 
not give an erroneous elements explanation" "demonstrate[s] that there had 
been question [sic] in the minds of the previous jury as to whether Ms. Gable 
was guilty of the offense." (Appellant's Brief, pp.10-11.) This is an unwarranted 
leap in logic. Not only is there no way to determine that the difference between 
the verdict in the second trial and the non-verdict in the first trial hinged on the 
addition of four words in closing argument - "or should have known" - it is highly 
unlikely that it did. The most notable difference between the first and second 
trial is that Gabel testified in the first and not in the second. While Gabel's 
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explanation during the first trial of what happened on the night she was arrested 
may have been sufficient to introduce reasonable doubt in the mind of at least 
one juror, it is hardly surprising that her boyfriend's testimony in the second trial 
did not given his extremely incredible version of events, which was premised on 
Officer Yago supposedly aggressively sticking is nose in the van window "like a 
dog" in a "hot vehicle trying to get fresh air," "assaulting" the driver, intimidating 
the other officers on scene into silence, and planting a "big bag of meth" while 
supposedly saying, "Yeah, that's some good stuff. That's some really good stuff 
there." (Trial Tr., p.115, Ls.13-24, p.117, L.2- p.118, L.19, p.134, L.19, p.136, 
L.5, p.157, Ls.16-19.) 
This Court can also confidently conclude that the prosecutor's singular 
use of the four words - "or should have known" - did not affect the outcome of 
the trial in light of the court's accurate elements instruction, the actual substance 
of the prosecutor's argument, and the overwhelming evidence of Gabel's guilt, 
including Gabel's own admissions about possessing the methamphetamine and 
smoking methamphetamine four hours prior to the traffic stop. (Exhibit 6.) 
Gabel next argues "[i]t was misconduct for the prosecution to give her [sic] 
opinion regarding Ms. Gabel's veracity." (Appellant's Brief, p.11.) Gabel 
contends this "was an improper attempt to influence the jury using the weight of 
her office." (Appellant's Brief, p.11.) The allegedly improper statements Gabel 
cites in support of her argument relate to the prosecutor discussing whether 
Gabel was being truthful when she initially told Officer Yago that she did not 
know what was in the baggie and whether her original statements were made 
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only because she was agreeing with what Officer Yago said. (Appellant's Brief, 
p.14.) Of course, the challenged statements must be considered in context, the 
entirety of which Gabel does not include in her brief. That context is as follows, 
and the comments about which Gabel complains appear in italics with the limited 
portions she includes appearing in bold: 
So that leads to the question did she know it was meth. Did 
she know what was in that baggie? Well, again, just look at the 
facts. Based on her boyfriend's testimony, they were in that car 
with a known drug dealer. They knew he dealt drugs. Based on 
her statements to the officer, we know that she has experimented 
with them. Those are her words on the audio: I've experimented 
with it. And then later: I used it about four hours ago. This is a 
Defendant who has used meth before. Did she know what was in 
that baggie? Yeah, she knew what was in that baggie. 
She tells the officer that she doesn't [know what was in 
the baggie]. She says oh, what's that, what's that? So then 
we have to ask, was she being truthful when she said oh, 
what's that? I don't know what it is. Would she have a motive 
to not be truthful at that point? / think so. Would she be trying 
not to get in trouble by pretending she didn't know what was in the 
bag? Maybe. She's used meth before. She knew what was in that 
bag. 
I want to talk about credibility just a little bit. During jury 
selection, we talked about how you decide who's being truthful 
when you have two different versions of events .... 
. . . You get to look at the credibility of the people involved 
and all the facts and decide who's telling the truth. 
Now, there's been a lot of information about the officer in 
this case being untruthful with the Defendant. He was. He used a 
strategic untruth that he had been taught to do in his training to 
elicit information from someone on scene. Why do we do that? 
Why would he do that? Well, you find something in the car, you 
have four people in it, and they all say, oh, not mine. Not my meth. 
You got to find some way for one of them to pony up and be 
truthful. It's called a strategic untruth, and it's what we teach our 
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officers to do, so he did it. He said to her, your boyfriend say he 
handed it to you. 
Now, the defense is going to tell you that everything that 
she said after that was a product of that untruth, that she was 
just mimicking the officer. She was just saying what he said. 
And if she had said, yeah, you're right and left it at that, / could 
maybe buy that. But she didn't. She went on and on to explain 
how it was handed to her, what she did with it, where she put it. 
And then in the second version she goes on and on about the 
friend and the party, and again it's handed to her and what she 
does with it. She doesn't just mimic him. She gives him a whole 
version of events. 
And today we're being asked to say that wasn't the truth. 
But she said it. She told us that. Did she possess 
methamphetamine? Did she know it was methamphetamine? One 
vehicle in this case. One bag of meth on one seat. And one 
Defendant who has told us twice that it was her methamphetamine 
that she held in her hand, that she possessed. 
(12/11/2013 Tr., p.25, L.10- p.28, L.10 (quoted in Appellant's Brief, p.14, italics 
and bracketed material by Gabel).) 
Gabel contends "the prosecution made impermissible statements inserting 
her personal view of the evidence, including repeatedly offering her opinion that 
Ms. Gabel was not telling the truth." (Appellant's Brief, p.14.) Gabel is incorrect. 
The entire point of the prosecutor's closing argument is to articulate the state's 
view of the evidence, and doing so does not constitute error. State v. Gross, 146 
Idaho 15, 18, 189 P.3d 477, 480 (Ct. App. 2008) (prosecutor has "considerable 
latitude in closing argument" and is "entitled to discuss fully ... the evidence and 
the inferences to be drawn therefrom"). Further, it is not improper to argue that 
the defendant is lying. State v. Mendoza, 151 Idaho 623, 262 P.3d 266 (Ct. App. 
2011 ), is illustrative. 
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Mendoza argued that the "prosecutor gave an 'impermissible personal 
opinion' regarding the truth or falsity of Mendoza's testimony during closing 
argument." Mendoza, 151 Idaho at 626, 262 P.3d at 269. Specifically, Mendoza 
asserted the following statement qualified as misconduct: 
[Defense counsel] is correct in that if you believe completely Miss 
Mendoza's story that she told yesterday on the stand, it does cover 
a whole lot of things. It explains a whole lot of things, but she also 
had four months to think of this story and to build this story so that 
she could, in fact, cover all of those bases. 
According to Mendoza, these comments reflected the prosecutor's opinion 
that Mendoza was lying that "interfered with the jury's ability to determine 
credibility." Mendoza, 151 Idaho at 626-627, 262 P.3d at 269-270. The Court of 
Appeals rejected Mendoza's argument, stating: 
Here, when the prosecutor made the comment about how 
Mendoza had time to think about and plan her testimony, he was 
merely assailing Mendoza's credibility. He did not inject any 
personal opinions about Mendoza lying; he simply invited the jury 
to make an inference from the evidence presented at trial which 
included the fact that Mendoza had already admitted to lying twice 
before with regard to how she acquired the counterfeit bills. 
Mendoza has failed to demonstrate that his comment was 
misconduct, much less that it violated her unwaived constitutional 
right to a fair trial, and therefore failed to show fundamental error. 
Mendoza, 151 Idaho at 627, 262 P.3d at 270. 
The same is true here. The specific comments about which Gabel 
complains were made in the context of the prosecutor's discussion of the 
evidence and what the jury should consider in weighing the credibility of the 
witnesses. A prosecutor may "express an opinion in argument as to the truth or 
falsity of testimony ... when such an opinion is based upon the evidence." State 
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v. Timmons, 145 Idaho 279, 288, 178 P.3d 644, 653 (Ct. App. 2007); see also 
State v. Priest, 128 Idaho 6, 14, 909 P.2d 624, 632 (Ct. App. 1996) (While a 
prosecutor may not "express a personal belief or opinion as to the truth or falsity 
of any testimony or evidence," a prosecutor may "express how, from [the 
prosecutor's] perspective, the evidence confirms or calls into doubt the credibility 
of particular witnesses."). As such, the prosecutor's argument in this case was 
entirely proper. Mendoza, 151 Idaho at 626, 262 P.3d at 269 ("Statements are 
not misconduct when it is apparent form the context in which the challenged 
statements were made that the prosecutor was analyzing the evidence and 
stating the conclusion that he urged the jury to draw from the evidence."). 
Gabel claims she has satisfied all three prongs of the fundamental error 
test, arguing (1) there was a constitutional violation because the prosecutor's 
comments "interfered with the jury's ability to make an impartial decision," (2) 
there is no evident tactical reason not to object to "hav[ing] the jury reach a 
verdict, not based on the evidence and law, but based on impermissible 
grounds," and (3) the comments "usurped the jury's role as the factfinder." 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.14-15.) The state fails to perceive how either of the 
comments about which Gabel complains encouraged the jury to find Gabel guilty 
"on impermissible grounds" or interfered with or usurped the jury's role as 
factfinder Noting that Gabel might have a motive to lie and did not just mimic the 
officer's proffered explanation for her possession of methamphetamine were not 
impermissible factors for the jury to consider in determining guilt and highlighting 
those points for the jury's consideration does not usurp the jury's role as 
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factfinder. Gabel has, therefore, failed to meet her burden of showing 
fundamental error based on her complaints about the prosecutor's comments, "I 
think so," and "I could maybe buy that." 
Even if this Court agrees with Gabel's contention that the prosecutor's use 
of the phrases "I think so" and "I could maybe buy that" amount to plain 
constitutional error, Gabel's substantial rights were not affected by those 
comments given the weight of the evidence presented as well as the court's 
instructions, which the jury was presumed to follow, and which included 
admonishing the jury that: 
[A]rguments and statements by lawyers [are not evidence]. The 
lawyers are not witnesses. What they say in their opening 
statements, closing arguments and at other times is included to 
help you interpret the evidence, but is not evidence. If the facts as 
you remember them differ from the way the lawyers have stated 
them, follow your memory. 
(Instruction No. 10 (augmentation).) 
Thus, at a minimum, Gabel has failed to satisfy the final element of the 
Perry fundamental error analysis with respect to her second misconduct claim 
just as she failed to satisfy this element in relation to her first misconduct claim. 
Because Gabel has failed to show any error in the prosecutor's closing 




The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment and 
sentences entered upon the jury verdicts finding Gabel guilty of felony battery on 
a probation and parole officer, two misdemeanor counts of possessing a 
controlled substance, and one count of possession of paraphernalia. 
DATED this 18th day of March, 2015. 
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Dee,ty Attorney General 
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